



**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2001/08/27 : CIA-RDP66R00638R000100150085-4

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION; DO NOT APPLY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

10 APR 1962

## OSD DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** General Maxwell D. Taylor, The White House  
The Honorable John A. McCone, Director,  
Central Intelligence Agency  
The Honorable U. Alexis Johnson, Department  
of State

**SUBJECT:** Interaction of U. S. Action in the U. N. with U. S. Satellite  
Reconnaissance Activities (S)

At the April 5 meeting, the 5412 Group deferred until April 12 consideration of State's proposal to register all U. S. space launchings regardless of how long in orbit. State also took the position that the matter of clandestine launches should be considered separately on its own merits.

I do not believe that this question of launch registration can be fully considered as a separate issue, out of context with our satellite reconnaissance developments and plans. The question of clandestine launches is entirely different if considered after establishing the precedent of registering all launches. The registry matter also could have a serious impact upon the possible use of decoys to cope with active countermeasures. It would seem, therefore, that we should consider all aspects of registry and other U. N. matters in the full context of our satellite reconnaissance program.

I also note that, at State's initiative, some working level staff consideration is being given to the question of our national policy concerning satellite reconnaissance, with emphasis on moving these activities away from secrecy toward "openness" along the lines of our NASA space program. I feel that so grave a question should receive the immediate and full consideration of the 5412 Group, and that a basic national policy should be determined for satellite reconnaissance at the earliest. It will then be relatively simple, and much safer, for U. S. actions in various arenas to be prepared in accordance with this policy. Some possible steps, considered separately, can have a serious and

2 12 Copies  
Page 1 of 16 Pages.  
Control No. 45-0036

**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2001/08/27 : CIA-RDP66R00638R000100150085-4

**SECRET**

far-reaching impact. The serious aspects are often not apparent when considered separately, especially when the explanation of objections must be somewhat superficial to avoid disclosure of sensitive matters of higher classification. Some possible steps are also irreversible, and once taken, completely preclude many future actions. This matter is one of some urgency, since meetings are now in session or will shortly begin in several concerned aspects of space and disarmament questions.

Accordingly, I enclose a proposed paper, prepared by Dr. Charyk, entitled "National Policy on Satellite Reconnaissance," and I recommend that the 5412 Group consider and settle this basic question of policy prior to any action on the several separate but related matters such as U. N. registration.

Signed

ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

1 Enclosure

Nat. Policy on Sat. Recon.,  
dtd 10 April 62

Copy to: Mr. McGeorge Bundy,  
The White House

**SECRET**

Page 2 of 12  
Control No. 45-0036